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CONTEMPORARY PROSECUTIONS OF
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA CRIMES: AN
ARGUMENT AGAINST RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AMENDMENTS
Michael Rowe *
I. INTRODUCTION
Racial tensions in the South and especially those in Mississippi boiled
over in the summer of 1964, partly as a result of the convergence of the
Freedom Summer volunteers on the state and the imminent passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 One newspaper account described Mississippi as
a “besieged fortress” where “[c]rosses were burned in 64 of the state’s 82
counties the night of April 24.” 2 Pervasive racism also infiltrated many
levels of state government, which included both non-violent, silent support
and violent, public support of racial segregation in public schools and
public accommodations.3 Partially as a response to the perceived
equalization of the races, the Ku Klux Klan received significant support not
just from ordinary citizens, but also from sympathizers entrenched within
certain state and local law enforcement agencies. These embedded Klan
sympathizers “provided both protection against prosecution and the
appearance that Klan activities—to some extent—were conducted under
color of state law.” 4
In the six months prior to May 26, 1964, five African Americans were
reported as murdered in a five-county radius in the southern corner of
*
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.S. Indiana University,
2003.
1
Racial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1964, at E1. The Freedom Summer was an
organized effort by several Civil Rights groups “in which 1,000 volunteers, white and Negro,
were to move into the state to promote Negro voter-registration, education and community
work.” Id.
2
Claude Sitton, Mississippi Is Gripped by Fear of Violence in Civil Rights Drive, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 1964, at 1.
3
Killen v. State, 958 So. 2d 172, 174 (Miss. 2007).
4
Id. at 175.
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Less than one month later, three Freedom Summer
Mississippi. 5
volunteers—Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James E.
Cheney—were reported missing in what was to become perhaps the most
famous of the Civil Rights Era murders, the “Mississippi Burning” case. 6
Among the racially motivated murders that summer were the May 2, 1964
murders of Charles Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee, a college student and
local laborer, respectively. 7 On the day of their murders, Moore and Dee
were hitchhiking when a Volkswagen driven by James Ford Seale stopped
to pick up the two boys. A truck carrying three co-conspirators followed
the Volkswagen to the national forest, where Seale and Charles Marcus
Edwards, among others, tied Moore and Dee to trees and “beat them with
‘bean poles,’ while [a co-conspirator] interrogated them . . . .” 8 Moore and
Dee eventually were tied to an engine block and dropped into the river, all
while they were still alive. 9
Six months later, Seale and Edwards were arrested and charged with
killing Moore and Dee. 10 While in custody, Edwards confessed to taking
Moore and Dee into the forest and whipping them, but nothing else, while
Seale stated that he had done it but the police would have to “prove it.”11
District Attorney Lenox Forman signaled his intention to bring the case
before a grand jury. 12 Forman’s actions all but ended the investigation, as a
grand jury composed entirely of white residents of Mississippi would never
bring an indictment against Edwards and Seale. 13 In fact, the charges were
dismissed on January 11, 1965, only two months after the original arrest. 14
Even if the defendants were indicted and brought before a jury, it was
unlikely that Seale and Edwards would have been convicted, given the
racial divisiveness of the time. 15 In fact, almost nothing about the murders
5

Sitton, supra note 2, at 1.
Claude Sitton, 3 in Rights Drive Reported Missing, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1964, at 1; see
Shaila Dewan, Pushing to Resolve Killings from the Civil Rights Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2007, at A11.
7
2 Whites Seized in Negro Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1964, at 56.
8
HARRY N. MACLEAN, THE PAST IS NEVER DEAD: THE TRIAL OF JAMES FORD SEALE AND
MISSISSIPPI’S STRUGGLE FOR REDEMPTION 66–67 (2009).
9
Id. at 67.
10
2 Whites Seized in Negro Slayings, supra note 7.
11
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 38–39; see also Donna Ladd, James Ford Seale: A Trail of
Documents Tells the Story, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Miss.), (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/index.php/site/comments/james_ford_seale_a_trail_of_do
cuments_tells_the_story.
12
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 39.
13
Id.
14
Whites Freed in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1965, at 18; see also Ladd, supra note
11.
15
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 37–38.
6
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was mentioned for the next forty years, until a number of other Civil Rights
Era crimes were brought to the public’s attention by a variety of local and
national media. 16 As a result of the renewed interest in prosecuting Civil
Rights Era crimes, James Ford Seale was charged again in 2007 for the role
he played in the deaths of Moore and Dee. Charles Marcus Edwards, his
co-conspirator, was given immunity by federal prosecutors in exchange for
his testimony against Seale. 17 The federal government indicted Seale under
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (c) for two counts of kidnapping and one count of
conspiracy to commit kidnapping. 18 Seale ultimately was found guilty on
all charges and sentenced to life in prison.19
The charges and conviction were predicated on the 1964 version of the
statute, which identified kidnapping as a capital punishment eligible offense
“if the kidnap[p]ed person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the
verdict of the jury shall so recommend.” 20 In conjunction with the capital
nature of the kidnapping statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 3281 provided an unlimited
statute of limitations for all federal indictments of capital offenses. 21
However, in the intervening period of time between the crime and the 2007
indictment, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for § 1201
charges was unconstitutional.22 As a result of that ruling, Congress
amended § 1201 to eliminate the death penalty as a potential punishment
for a § 1201 conviction. 23
The critical legal question to come from Seale’s 2007 conviction is
whether Civil Rights Era kidnapping prosecutions should proceed under the
unlimited statute of limitations offered by the 1964 version of § 1201 or
under the 1972 amendment to § 1201. This Comment addresses this issue
beginning in Part II, which provides a more complete introduction to the
procedural history of Seale’s conviction, including the Fifth Circuit’s
16
Following the 1994 conviction of Byron De La Beckwith, the local and national
media, including ABC’s program 20/20, sought to expose additional unsolved Civil Rights
Era murders. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 50–51. A sampling of cases that received the most
attention include Ernest Avants’s conviction for his role in the death of Ben Chester White,
Edgar Ray Killen’s conviction for his role in the death of three civil rights workers in 1964,
and Bobby Frank Cherry’s conviction for his role in the deaths of four young girls killed in a
Birmingham Church bombing. Id. at 57–60.
17
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 102–03.
18
United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 2008).
19
United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2009).
20
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964).
21
Id. at § 3281.
22
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968) (holding “the death penalty
provision of the Federal Kidnap[p]ing Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the
exercise of a constitutional right”).
23
Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States,
Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972).
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appellate review of Seale’s conviction and the Supreme Court’s refusal to
address the Fifth Circuit’s certified question. Part II also provides a
description of the changes to § 1201 since it was originally introduced in
1932. Part III is divided into three subparts: subpart A addresses the
various tools a court may use to interpret the 1972 amendment to § 1201
including the general rule regarding statutory retroactivity; subpart B
addresses the potential for due process violations associated with the fortythree year delay between the commission of the crime and the indictment;
and subpart C addresses normative considerations for not applying the 1972
amendment retroactively. Finally, Part IV argues that the statute of
limitations for Civil Rights Era kidnappings under § 1201 should be
unlimited.
II. BACKGROUND
A full understanding of the background of Seale’s offense requires,
first, an appreciation of the procedural complexity of the case, and second, a
primer on how § 1201 has evolved in the last forty years. This Part will
address both of these issues individually.
A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Procedurally, United States v. Seale took a circuitous path through the
federal courts, notwithstanding the fact that it took forty-three years to bring
Seale to trial in the first place.24 As mentioned, Seale was initially
convicted in the Southern District of Mississippi for two counts of
kidnapping and one count of conspiracy to commit kidnapping. 25 In an oral
opinion on a defense motion to drop the charges based on an expired statute
of limitations, the district court focused almost exclusively on United States
v. Jackson in ruling that § 1201 was a capital crime for purposes of Seale’s
criminal offense and, as such, the unlimited statute of limitations should
apply. 26 Seale’s attorneys appealed to the Fifth Circuit on seven different
issues, including an assertion that the district court erred in denying the
defense’s statute of limitations motion. Seale’s motion asserted that as a
result of the intervening 1972 amendment to § 1201, a five-year statute of
limitations was applicable and had since expired. 27 A three-judge panel on
the Fifth Circuit only considered Seale’s statute of limitations argument and
unanimously voted to vacate the conviction by ruling “that the five-year
limitations period made applicable to the federal kidnap[p]ing statute by the
24
25
26
27

United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1036.
See id. at 1034.
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1972 amendment applies to this case, where the alleged offense occurred in
1964 and the indictment was issued in 2007.” 28
In November 2008, a majority of the Fifth Circuit judges voted to
rehear the case en banc over a vigorous dissent by Judge Smith. 29 The
following June, the en banc Fifth Circuit split nine-to-nine on whether to
affirm the conviction. 30 In July, the Fifth Circuit sent a certified question to
the Supreme Court, asking: “What statute of limitations applies to a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 for a kidnap[p]ing offense that
occurred in 1964 but was not indicted until 2007?”31 In November 2009,
the Supreme Court refused to answer the certified question over vigorous
disagreement from both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia. Justice
Stevens—writing for himself and Justice Scalia—recognized the
importance of the certified question and reasoned that “[a] prompt answer
from this Court [would] expedite the termination of this litigation and
determine whether other similar cases may be prosecuted.” 32 Justice
Stevens also characterized the certified question as “narrow, debatable, and
important.” 33 By refusing to answer the certified question, the Supreme
Court effectively affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Seale’s
statute of limitations motion. Thus, the district court’s initial conviction of
Seale and imposition of a life sentence were affirmed.
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1201

Equally as important as understanding the procedural complexity of
Seale is an understanding of the various changes 18 U.S.C. § 1201 has
undergone since its adoption. The statute was first enacted in 1932 as part
of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which followed the outrage generated from
the kidnapping of the Charles Lindbergh baby. 34 Prior to that high-profile

28

Id. at 1045.
United States v. Seale, 550 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2008). In dissent, Judge Smith argued
that “the government has not shown that the panel erred or that this case [merits] en banc
consideration.” He further placed the blame on the Department of Justice for the abrogation
of justice. Id. at 377.
30
United States v. Seale, 570 F.3d 650, 650–51 (5th Cir. 2009).
31
United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 2009).
32
130 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
33
Id.
34
The twenty-month-old son of Charles Lindbergh was kidnapped on March 1, 1932.
Child Stolen in Evening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1932, at 1. What is today 18 U.S.C. § 1201
was for a period of time known simply as the Lindbergh Law. See generally New Lindbergh
Law is Invoked in Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1932, at 15.
29
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case, kidnapping was only punishable under state law. 35 Thus, § 1201
created a new federal offense for kidnapping that crossed state lines. 36
The first major change to § 1201 was made in 1972 as a response to
both United States v. Jackson 37 and Furman v. Georgia. 38 Jackson
invalidated and severed from § 1201 the potential for the imposition of the
death penalty for kidnapping offenses. 39 More specifically, the Court held
that “[t]he statute sets forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty
upon a defendant who waives the right to [a] jury trial or upon one who
pleads guilty,” 40 and the “inevitable effect of any such provision is, of
course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead
guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury
trial.” 41 The Court in Furman, on the other hand, cast doubt on the
imposition of the death penalty for all crimes. The Furman Court held that
“the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” 42 Congress responded to the Court in 1972 by
passing the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests
of the United States, which in part amended § 1201 to eliminate the
possibility of a death sentence. 43
The most recent and major change to § 1201 occurred in 1994, when
Congress enacted a spate of tough-on-crime legislation, including the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. 44 This Act amended
§ 1201 once again; it now provides that “if the death of any person results
[from the kidnapping], [the perpetrator] shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment.” 45 The 1972 amendment taken together with the 1994
amendment to § 1201 means the federal kidnapping offense was a noncapital punishment eligible crime only from 1972 to 1994. At all other
points since the statute was created in 1932, a § 1201 conviction was a
death-penalty eligible offense.

35

United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1323–24 (5th Cir. 1979).
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006).
37
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
38
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
39
390 U.S. at 572.
40
Id. at 571.
41
Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
42
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court reopened the door for capital punishment in certain circumstances. 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
43
Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972).
44
Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 60003(a)(6), § 1201, 108 Stat. 1796, 1969 (1994).
45
Id.
36
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Section 1201 has never expressly contained its own statute of
limitations period. Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3281, Capital Offenses, 46 has
always applied to § 1201, for determination of the appropriate statute of
limitations for a kidnapping prosecution and other capital punishment
eligible offenses. Section 3281 provides that “[a]n indictment for any
offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation.”47
Thus, as long as § 1201 remained a capital punishment eligible offense, the
combination of § 1201 and § 3281 provided an unlimited statute of
limitations period. Non-capital federal offenses are governed by § 3282,
which provides, that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital,
unless the indictment is found . . . within five years. . . .” 48 As a result,
kidnapping crimes committed between 1972 and 1994 were subject only to
a five-year statute of limitations period because the underlying offense was
not eligible for the death penalty.
III. DISCUSSION
The curious byproduct of Seale’s unique procedural history is that the
only opinion of any length is Judge DeMoss’s original Fifth Circuit opinion
that vacated Seale’s conviction.49 In fact, the per curiam en banc opinion of
the Fifth Circuit affirming the district court’s denial of the statute of
limitations motion is only two sentences. 50 Accordingly, subpart A of this
Part begins by following the structure of the original Fifth Circuit opinion
that vacated the conviction with an evaluation of whether the 1972
amendment to § 1201 should be applied retroactively. Subpart B departs
from the original Fifth Circuit opinion to identify whether due process
considerations should nullify a forty-three year delay in prosecution.
Finally, subpart C considers the traditional justifications for enforcing a
statute of limitations period and whether those justifications are relevant to
the prosecution of a Civil Rights Era offender.
A. RETROACTIVITY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENT TO § 1201

As previously mentioned, Congress passed the Act for the Protection
of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States in 1972,
largely in response to the Court’s decisions in Jackson and Furman. 51 The

46
47
48
49
50
51

18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006). Section 3281 has not changed significantly since 1964.
Id.
Id. at § 3282.
United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Seale, 570 F.3d 650, 650 (5th Cir. 2009).
Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972).
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original Fifth Circuit opinion started its analysis with a determination of
whether the 1972 amendment to § 1201 should be applied retroactively to
crimes committed prior to 1972, 52 and this Comment will begin with that
same determination. The importance of determining whether the 1972
amendment should be applied retroactively cannot be overstated since such
an application could render Seale’s conviction and all subsequent Civil
Rights Era convictions predicated upon § 1201 void. Thus, this first
subpart analyzes the various legislative interpretation tools a court might
use to determine whether the 1972 amendment should apply retroactively,
including (1) congressional intent in changing the capital nature of the
kidnapping statute in 1972 and (2) the general policy against retroactivity.
In the following analysis, it becomes clear that the amendment should not
apply to crimes committed prior to 1972.
1. Legislative Intent
The first interpretation tool a court might use in assessing the
retroactivity of the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is legislative intent.53 In
other words, the question is whether it was Congress’s intent to expressly
change the statute of limitations period by eliminating the capital nature of
§ 1201 offenses or was Congress simply concerned with complying with
the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in Furman and Jackson. Only
the former interpretation would permit the 1972 amendment to operate
retroactively.
It is first instructive to recall the original Fifth Circuit panel’s
construction of the legislative intent of the 1972 amendment. The original
Fifth Circuit panel reviewed the House debate in the Congressional Record
and noted that Representative Richard Poff, the author of the 1972
amendment, stated that the death penalty provision was removed from the

52

Seale, 542 F.3d at 1036 (“[T]o determine whether an amendment to a statute should be
given retroactive effect, we first look to the intent of Congress.”).
53
There have been a significant number of criticisms leveled at the use of legislative
intent as a statutory interpretation tool. Justice Scalia has been the most vocal advocate for
its elimination, as he favors a brand of new textualism that attempts to determine the original
meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, other Justices, including Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, have
continued to use legislative intent as an interpretation tool. See, e.g., Chisom, 501 U.S. at
395–96; Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 516–21 (1989). While it appears
that Justice Scalia’s brand of new textualism was popular among his colleagues from his
appointment in 1986 to 1995, “it remains important to research and brief the legislative
history thoroughly.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
795 (4th ed. 2007).
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bill as a response to Furman. 54 Based on that statement, the court presumed
that Congress was aware of the statute of limitations and thus, expressly
finding that there was no legislative history to the contrary, the court
inferred that Congress intended to change the limitations period.55 The
panel, however, ignored Representative Poff’s more salient discussion
regarding the elimination of the death penalty as a potential punishment.
Representative Poff stated that the 1972 amendment should be construed as
“nothing but a stopgap handling of the death penalty question,” and “[a]
more lasting determination of how, and whether, the death penalty might be
prescribed . . . is an important and complex matter in itself, and passage of
this otherwise relatively noncontroversial measure should not await a
permanent resolution of that issue.” 56 Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s
assertion, Representative Poff appeared willing to amend the death penalty
component of § 1201 only as a means of maintaining the constitutionality
of the entire statute.
It is undeniable that the change in the potential punishment for
kidnappings in no way reflects a congressional desire to change the statute
of limitations period. Nothing in the Congressional Record suggests that it
became easier to solve kidnappings or that the crime was any less deserving
of an unlimited limitations period. This is a very different type of
legislative intent from what was suggested by the original Seale panel, and
certainly different than a willful change to the statute of limitations. The
Fifth Circuit’s inference with respect to the limitations period is simply
unsupported by the Congressional Record. Alternatively, Representative
Poff’s statement that the elimination of the death penalty as a stopgap
measure more strongly supports an inference that Congress only intended to
change the punishment to maintain the constitutionality of § 1201 offenses
post-Furman.
Another, albeit much less persuasive, piece of evidence from the
Congressional Record evidencing congressional intent is the title of the
bill—the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of
the United States. 57 The bill’s title reflects the impetus for the bill, and the
Congressional Record notes there has been a “disturbing increase of

54

United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1036 n.5 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 118 CONG. REC.
27116 (1972)).
55
Id. at 1036–39.
56
118 CONG. REC. 27116 (1972).
57
In determining legislative intent, the title of a particular bill is probative at best and
irrelevant at worst. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has reviewed the
title of a bill in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 527–
28 (2002); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892).
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Additionally,
violence directed against [foreign] diplomats.” 58
Representative Poff indicates that the “purpose of this legislation is to
promote the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States by protecting
the property and the personnel of foreign governments while they are
present in this country.” 59 The text of the bill itself is equally illustrative.
For example, Section 2 states that “this legislation is intended to afford the
United States jurisdiction . . . to proceed against those who . . . interfere
with its conduct of foreign affairs.” 60
While the title of a bill or its general purpose is by no means definitive
evidence of congressional intent, it is at least helpful for our purposes to
illustrate that Congress likely did not consider or intend the corresponding
change to the statute of limitations period. Even conceding that the
Congressional Record is not a dispositive statutory interpretation tool, it is
undeniable that the record does not permit an inference that Congress
specifically intended to change the statute of limitations period.
2. General Policy Against Retroactivity
The second interpretation tool at a court’s disposal is the general
policy against retroactivity, which has been described as “deeply rooted in
[the Supreme Court’s] jurisprudence” 61 and “a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic.” 62 One principal justification for the general antiretroactivity doctrine is the Court’s desire to create “a rule of law that gives
people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.”63
Retroactive legislation unfairly upsets the ability of private actors to plan
their behavior in accordance with federal law.64
While a general presumption against statutory retroactivity exists, the
Court in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital provided a legislative
escape hatch when it held that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,”
and as a result, “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not
be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.” 65 As the preceding analysis on legislative intent indicated, there
was no support in the legislative history to the 1972 amendment to § 1201
for the idea that Congress intended to have the change in punishment and
58

118 CONG. REC. 27113 (1972).
Id. at 27116.
60
Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States,
Pub. L. No. 92-539, 86 Stat. 1070, 1071 (1972).
61
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 266.
64
Id.
65
488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (emphasis added).
59
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subsequent change in the statute of limitations apply retroactively. 66 Thus,
the Bowen escape hatch does not apply to § 1201 prosecutions similar to
Seale’s.
Despite what now appears to be the current policy against legislative
retroactivity, some commentators depict the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence as having vacillated “between a flexible discretionary
approach and a bright-line rule” for a period of time, especially as it
grappled with its substantive due process jurisprudence at the turn of the
century. 67 In writing for the majority in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 68
Justice Stevens sought to reconcile the doctrinal confusion. Justice Stevens
noted the disfavor with which the Court viewed legislative retroactivity 69
and created the following three scenarios (in addition to the clear intent rule
discussed in Bowen) that would permit retroactive application of a new
statute: (1) “the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of
prospective relief[,]” 70 (2) the intervening statute changes a court’s
jurisdiction, 71 or (3) the intervening statute changes the procedural rules.72
Justice Stevens defended the exclusion of procedural changes from the
retroactivity doctrine because private actors have “diminished reliance
interests in matters of procedure,” and “rules of procedure regulate
secondary rather than primary conduct.” 73
The Fifth Circuit panel availed itself of the third Landgraf exception
and construed the change in the statute of limitations period for kidnapping
offenses as procedural in nature. 74 As a result, that Court held that
Congress intended the 1972 amendment to apply retroactively. 75 In so
ruling, the panel provided a less-than-helpful definition of a procedural
change: “statutes of limitations are procedural in nature because they do not
disturb substantive rights.” 76 A Florida district court provided a more
helpful definition: “[a] substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights

66

Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972).
Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1997).
68
511 U.S. 244 (1994).
69
Id. at 268.
70
Id. at 273.
71
Id. at 274.
72
Id. at 275.
73
Id.
74
United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 2008).
75
Id. at 1036–37.
76
Id. at 1037.
67
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as opposed to procedural or remedial law which prescribes a method of
enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.” 77
In citing Landgraf, the original Fifth Circuit Seale panel ignored an
important qualification espoused in Landgraf for applying procedural
changes retroactively. Justice Stevens wrote that “the mere fact that a new
rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case.” 78
For example, Justice Stevens cited a 1990 amendment to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the proposition that “amendments [are]
applicable to pending cases insofar as they are ‘just and practicable.’” 79
Thus, identification of a legislative change as procedural creates a
presumption that can be overcome by a showing of some manifest injustice
or impracticability. A showing of injustice by the prosecution in a case
such as Seale’s would overcome the procedural/substantive distinction even
if the change in statute of limitations period was construed as strictly
procedural.
Given the legislative retroactivity doctrine adopted by Landgraf, two
related questions remain with respect to Seale and other similarly situated
Civil Rights Era prosecutions under § 1201. The first question is whether a
change in the applicable statute of limitations should be construed as
procedural or substantive. Second, if the statute of limitations is identified
as procedural, it must be determined whether applying the 1972 amendment
retroactively is just.
a. Is a Change in the Statute of Limitations Period Procedural or
Substantive in Nature?
In Seale, the original Fifth Circuit panel ruled that the change in the
statute of limitations period was procedural in nature. 80 In reaching that
conclusion, the court noted that “[c]riminal statutes of limitation merely
limit the time in which the government can initiate a criminal charge and do
not burden substantive rights.” 81 The Fifth Circuit also relied in part on
State v. Skakel, which held that an extension to a limitations period can be
applied retroactively as long as the initial limitations period had not
expired. 82 The Skakel court is not alone in holding that the limitations
period is a procedural component of a statute. In fact, the Skakel court cites
77
Richardson v. Honda Motor Co., 686 F. Supp. 303, 304 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (citation
omitted).
78
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.29.
79
Id. (quoting Order Amending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 495 U.S. 969
(1990)).
80
Seale, 542 F.3d at 1036–37.
81
Id. at 1037.
82
Id. at 1038 (quoting State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1022 (Conn. 2006)).
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a total of twenty-one state law cases suggesting that a change in the
limitations period should apply retroactively, while citing five cases that
held such a change should be applied only prospectively. 83 Nevertheless,
the original Fifth Circuit panel erred by construing the 1972 amendment as
procedural, and thus retroactive, since its ruling (1) is not consistent with
Landgraf, (2) ignores the effect of a reduced statute of limitations as
described in the Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District 84
concurring opinion, and (3) ignores the more basic distinctions between
substantive and procedural changes.
First, the 1972 amendment to § 1201 appears to be similar to the
congressional action that the Supreme Court confronted in Landgraf. The
issue presented in Landgraf was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 should be applied retroactively to a plaintiff that was demanding a
jury trial. 85 Prior to the 1991 Act, the Civil Rights Act only provided for
equitable remedies. 86 One principal change in the 1991 Act was the
provision providing that a plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive
damages could demand a jury trial. 87 The plaintiff in Landgraf experienced
workplace discrimination prior to the enactment of the 1991 Act.88 Because
of the change in available remedies, the plaintiff sought to avail herself of
the new provisions with respect to a jury trial. 89 The Landgraf Court,
however, held that the statute could not be applied retroactively because the
statute was substantive in nature.90
The statutory change in damages available in Landgraf appears
remarkably similar to the statutory change in the punishment available to
prosecutors for a § 1201 conviction. Both statutory amendments changed
the available remedies, which had a secondary effect on a substantive right.
If Landgraf is our guide for determining whether a statutory change is
procedural or substantive, then the 1972 amendment falls on the substantive
side of the discussion.
A second concern with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the statute of
limitations change affected simple procedural rights was its failure to take
account of a principal difference between Skakel and Seale. The twentyone cases that Skakel cites to support its holding are predicated on statutory
83

Skakel, 888 A.2d at 1024–25.
49 F.3d 886, 891–92 (2d Cir. 1995).
85
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 247 (1994).
86
Id. at 252.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 887–88.
89
Id. at 249.
90
Id. at 281 (finding “a jury trial [is] available only ‘[i]f a complaining party seeks
compensatory or punitive damages’”).
84
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amendments that extended the statute of limitations period while the initial
limitations period was still valid. 91 Those cases do not account for what
should happen when the limitations period is shortened. This is exactly the
scenario that the concurring opinion worried about in Vernon v. Cassadaga
Valley Central School District, a case cited by the Fifth Circuit in Seale. 92
The issue presented to the court in Vernon was how to apply a 1991
amendment that changed the statute of limitations period for civil suits
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 93
After noting a split among other circuit courts as to the retroactivity of the
1991 amendment, a two-judge majority ruled that a statutory change to the
statute of limitations for ADEA civil actions should be applied
retroactively. 94
Judge Cabranes’s concurrence in Vernon is most relevant to this
Comment. Judge Cabranes suggested that there is an inherent difficulty in
defining a statute of limitations change as procedural or substantive, noting
that such a change “lie[s] on the cusp of the procedural/substantive
distinction.” 95 More importantly, Judge Cabranes presciently worried about
statutory changes that shorten the statute of limitations period, which is
precisely the type of statutory change affecting § 1201 prosecutions.96
Judge Cabranes stated that in a civil context, “absent a clear statement from
Congress, the new, shorter period should not be applied to plaintiffs who
never had a chance to comply with the new rule.” 97 Ultimately, the
concurrence found little use in labeling a change in the statute of limitations
as procedural or substantive given the amorphous nature of such a
distinction. 98 To illustrate his point, Judge Cabranes noted that the
limitations period was “treated as ‘procedural’ for choice-of-law purposes
in context of [the] Full Faith and Credit Clause,” 99 while at the same time it
was treated as substantive “for Erie doctrine purposes.” 100 Instead, Judge
Cabranes favored reviewing the statutory change in the context of the larger
91

State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1024–25 (Conn. 2006).
United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1037 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Vernon v.
Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 889 (2d Cir. 1995)).
93
Vernon, 49 F.3d at 889.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 892 (Cabranes, J., concurring); see also United States v. Blue Sea Line, 553 F.2d
445, 448 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that “the distinction between procedure and substance tends
to confuse more than clarify”). Notably, the original Fifth Circuit Seale opinion cited this
exact language. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 2008).
96
Vernon, 49 F.3d at 891 (Cabranes., J., concurring).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 892.
100
Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–29 (1988)).
92
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legislative scheme. 101 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit is accurate in
highlighting cases that conclude a change in a limitations period is
procedural, it is simply incorrect to ignore the effects of lengthening versus
shortening the limitations period.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis oversimplified the distinction
between procedural and substantive statutory changes, as the court was
mistaken in asserting that a change in the statute of limitations does not
affect substantive rights. To the contrary, a statute of limitations change
affects at least three parties’ substantive rights. First, a change to the
limitations period can determine whether or not a defendant faces criminal
charges. It seems obvious that compelling an individual to stand trial and
face the potential for a state-imposed punishment clearly changes that
person’s substantive rights—jail time is a prima facie example of a
reduction in liberty, which is a substantive right. Additionally, an offender
who faced an initial limitations period of two years at the time of the
offense and subsequently faced a five-year limitations period as a result of a
legislative change has clearly had his substantive rights affected. The fact
that Seale faced a reduced limitations period after the 1972 amendment
does not mean his substantive rights were any less affected.
The individual standing trial is not the only party whose substantive
rights are affected by a change in the statute of limitations. The government
has a substantive interest in ensuring justice in incarcerating criminals to
prevent them from committing subsequent offenses. Additionally, the
family members of the victims have substantive interests in seeing justice
come to bear on those responsible for the deaths of their relatives.102 Given
the potential effect on the substantive rights of these three parties, it is
disingenuous to suggest that a change in the limitations period is nothing
more than procedural.
b. Is a Retroactive Application of the 1972 Amendment Just?
Recall Judge Cabranes’s desire to review statutory changes in the
context of the broader legislative scheme 103 and Justice Stevens’s desire to
review the statutory change for injustice.104 Both reviews eschew the
strictures of a bright-line retroactivity rule in favor of a rule that ensures
injustice does not result from a retroactive application of a statute. The
preceding distinction between procedural and substantive rights is therefore
irrelevant if the statutory change in question would create injustice for one
101
102
103
104

Id. (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557–58 (1974)).
See infra text accompanying note 107.
Vernon, 49 F.3d at 892 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 n.29 (1994).
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or more of the parties. This subsection evaluates whether a retroactive
application of § 1201 is just.
Most justifications for the retroactivity doctrine begin with the
assertion that the law should give fair notice to private actors so they may
be able to order their primary behavior.105 However, this concern for fair
notice and private planning is not present in Seale’s case. Seale had the
opportunity to inform himself of the intricacies of the 1964 version of
§ 1201 to the extent he was interested, and he had his opportunity to order
his affairs in conformance with the 1964 law. Instead, Seale and his coconspirators willfully chose to violate the kidnapping provisions as enacted
at the time of the murder. There is simply no evidence that Seale faced
injustice during his 2007 prosecution since he had adequate notice via the
1964 version of § 1201 that provided for an unlimited statute of limitations
for kidnappings that resulted in harm to the victim. 106 There is no reason to
give him the benefit of a subsequent statutory change based on the belief
that he was unable to properly order his affairs.
On the other hand, the victims’ families and the government might
argue that they independently had a reasonable interest in the 1964 version
of § 1201. Victims and their family members have a significant stake in the
outcome of a criminal trial, and it would be foolish to ignore their collective
interest in justice. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Payne v.
Tennessee that “the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result
of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of the
criminal law . . . .” 107 As a result, if any party had a reliance interest in the
kidnapping law, it was the prosecution and the victims’ families.
Ultimately, the absence of injustice against Seale and the manifest injustice
the victims’ families would dictate that the 1972 amendment to § 1201
should only be applied prospectively.
In the end, it is clear that statutory interpretation tools do not support a
retroactive application of the 1972 amendment to § 1201. First, a review of
the legislative history of the 1972 bill reveals a complete absence of intent
to change the limitations period as opposed to simply changing the
punishment. Similarly, Congress’s textual silence as to the amendment’s
general retroactivity prevents the retroactivity doctrine’s escape hatch from
being employed. Next, notwithstanding Congress’s silence, a change to the
105

Id. at 265.
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964) (amended 2006).
107
501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991). Payne expressly permitted the use of victim impact
statements in certain circumstances and in the process overruled both South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). The propriety
of Payne is well beyond the confines of this Comment. It is cited herein simply to suggest
that courts can and do consider victims’ interests.
106
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statute of limitations period should be construed as a change to a
substantive right, which limits a court’s ability to apply the limitations
period retroactively. Finally, a court should not apply the amendment
retroactively due to the potential of injustice to the prosecution and the
victims’ families. Because a retroactive application of the 1972 amendment
is improper, prosecution against Seale and other § 1201 defendants should
proceed under the pre-1972 version of the statute.
B. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

To the extent that the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is not applied
retroactively, the next question to consider with respect to Seale and
similarly situated Civil Rights Era prosecutions based on § 1201 is whether
a significant (forty-three years for Seale) delay in bringing charges against a
potential defendant violates the due process rights of that defendant. The
Supreme Court in United States v. Lovasco held that “the Due Process
Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because
they disagree with a prosecutor’s judgment as to when to seek an
indictment.” 108 Furthermore, the Court held that “[j]udges are not free . . .
to impose on law enforcement officials our ‘personal and private notions’ of
fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function.’” 109 In response to this due process consideration, this subpart
will review other recent Civil Rights Era prosecutions to determine whether
such a pre-indictment delay abridges the procedural due process rights of
the defendant.
Seale is not the first Civil Rights Era prosecution that has faced an
appreciable amount of time between the alleged crime and the indictment.
To name just a few others, Ernest Avants was convicted for his role in the
death of Ben Chester White; Edgar Ray Killen was convicted for his role in
the death of three civil rights workers in 1964; and Bobby Frank Cherry
was convicted for his role in the deaths of four young girls killed in a
Birmingham church bombing. 110 While no Seale opinion addressed the due
process question, another recent Civil Rights Era prosecution, Killen v.
State, did. 111 In reviewing due process considerations associated with the
delay in prosecution, the court in Killen applied a two-prong test developed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Marion. 112 The Marion test asks
108

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
Id.
110
See supra text accompanying note 16.
111
958 So. 2d 172, 189–91 (Miss. 2007). While Killen is a state prosecution and Seale is
a federal prosecution, similar procedural due process issues existed given the prosecutorial
delay present in both cases.
112
Id. at 189.
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the following two questions in determining whether a pre-indictment delay
violated the defendant’s due process rights: (1) did the pre-indictment delay
cause actual prejudice, and (2) was the pretrial delay used intentionally by
the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage? 113 Although the Marion test
allows a defendant to make a due process argument with respect to preindictment delays, the argument is rarely successful because the defendant
bears a heavy burden in proving that the delay offended due process. 114
Nevertheless, the following analysis will evaluate the components of the
Marion test individually as it relates to § 1201 prosecutions.
1. Actual Prejudice
The Mississippi Supreme Court recently applied the Marion test in
Killen v. State. 115 Edgar Ray Killen was originally acquitted in 1967 of
federal charges that alleged he “conspire[d] to violate the civil rights” of
three Mississippi Freedom Summer civil rights workers that were killed in
1964. 116 Forty-one years after the murders, Killen was charged and
convicted in state court on three counts of manslaughter. 117 In affirming
Killen’s conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the two-prong
Marion test to determine whether the delay in charges resulted in a
violation of Killen’s procedural due process rights. 118 In doing so, the
Court first held that the defendant’s old age, his failing health, and the
inability of a court to find a jury of his peers (Killen argued that a jury of
his peers was not available since “they had long passed away or were too
old to serve on juries”) did not constitute actual prejudice. 119 Killen also
argued that faded memories and the potential lack of cross-examination of
key witnesses also created actual prejudice.120 In ruling against Killen’s
faded memories argument, the Killen court relied on De La Beckwith v.
State, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court held that “[v]ague assertions
of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient
to establish a due process violation from preindictment delay.” 121 Thus,

113

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
See Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that “the
Constitution places a very heavy burden on a defendant to show that [the] pre-indictment
delay has offended due process”); see also Killen, 958 So. 2d at 191.
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Killen, 958 So. 2d at 188–91.
116
Id. at 173.
117
Id. at 173–74.
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Id. at 189.
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Id.
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Id. at 190.
121
De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 570 (Miss. 1997) (citing United States v.
Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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Seale or another § 1201 defendant will likely be unsuccessful in making
general assertions about lost witnesses and evidence, in addition to being
unsuccessful with respect to a claim about the defendant’s health, age, or
the lack of a jury of his peers.
One question the Killen and De La Beckwith Courts left open is
whether a previous trial is necessary to obviate the due process inquiry. For
example, the Killen and De La Beckwith courts allowed both the
prosecution and defense to use testimony and evidence from the original
proceedings to the extent that a witness had died prior to the most recent
trial. In fact, six of the state’s fourteen witnesses in Killen were called by
transcript from the previous trial. 122
As mentioned, no Seale opinion addressed whether the forty-three year
indictment delay for Seale resulted in an abridgement of his procedural due
process rights. We are left to rely on other courts’ rulings to determine
whether Seale or any other similarly situated § 1201 defendant faced an
abridgment of their due process rights. To begin, Killen seems to stand for
the proposition that age, health, and juries consisting of “non-peers” are
non-starters, and that type of argument clearly would not help Seale prove a
violation of his due process rights.
A key difference between Seale on the one hand and Killen and De La
Beckwith on the other, however, is that Seale never faced trial at some
earlier point in time. The absence of an original trial might allow Seale to
construct a stronger argument that his due process rights were violated since
he cannot avail himself of evidence from a 1960s trial. However, Seale and
his co-conspirator Charles Marcus Edwards had both allegedly confessed to
certain aspects of the murders after their initial arrest in November 1964 123
and presumably faced certain pretrial procedures before their charges were
dropped. Such procedures might lessen the actual bias against Seale.
Furthermore, Seale has the potential to discover documents detailing why
his charges were originally dropped; reliable (albeit old) evidence is still
available to both the prosecution and Seale.124 Neither the prosecution nor
the defense has to rely entirely on the potential for failed memories since
both sides can use evidence that had been previously memorialized in one
form or another. Thus, while a transcript from trial was not available for
Seale’s prosecution, other documents including his confession and other
pretrial procedures were available to both sides, which drastically lessens
any potential actual prejudice.

122
123
124

Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190.
MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 38–39; see also Ladd, supra note 11.
Dewan, supra note 6, at A11.
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Ultimately, and to the extent that Seale and other similarly situated
§ 1201 defendants attempt to argue that their lack of an initial trial presents
actual bias, Killen suggests that their arguments must be more than simple
“[v]ague assertions” of actual prejudice, which might include the death of a
key witness or some other specific assertion regarding the spoliation of key
evidence.125 Failing any specific allegation of bias, it is unlikely that Seale
or any other § 1201 defendant will be able to prove the existence of actual
prejudice, especially since their original statements to investigators in 1964
and other pretrial procedural evidence could be used during the
contemporary trial.
2. Intentional Delay
Even to the extent that Seale or some other § 1201 defendant is able to
prove actual prejudice, that defendant is also required to prove that there
was an intentional delay on the part of the prosecution to gain some tactical
advantage during trial. 126 One court interpreted the second prong of the
Marion test to mean that pre-indictment delay could not be used to harass
the defendant. 127 Yet another court has interpreted Marion’s second prong
to mean that the prosecution must actually intend to gain a tactical
advantage via the pre-indictment delay and that simple negligence will not
suffice. 128
In Killen, the court was not forced to address the merits of an
intentional delay claim since actual prejudice did not exist. 129 Nevertheless,
it acknowledged the existence of Killen’s tactical advantage argument
before quickly dismissing it. Killen argued that the state gained a tactical
advantage because the nature of jury duty and the type of jurors selected for
jury duty materially changed from the 1960s to his prosecution in 2005. 130
Killen’s brief stated, “It would be foolish to argue that the attitude of the
general public has not changed from the sixties all to the advantage of the
State and to actual prejudice against [Killen].” 131 The Mississippi Supreme
Court noted that Killen’s assertion was probably accurate, but there was no
legal precedent for such an assertion and the claim simply lacked merit. 132
One might expect for Seale and other § 1201 defendants to make similar

125
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127
128
129
130
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Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
United States v. McMullin, 511 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1152–53 (Md. 2001).
Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190–91.
Id. at 191.
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arguments, but Killen appears to foreclose the possibility that such an
assertion might succeed.
A second type of intentional delay argument was foreclosed in United
States v. Eisbart. 133 The court in Eisbart held that an allegation “that
evidence sufficient to indict was available to the Government well in
advance” of the indictment is not adequate to support an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct.134 This ruling appears to be consistent with a
Maryland Court of Appeals ruling that stated that simple negligence is not
enough to prove the prosecution gained a tactical advantage. 135
Ultimately, Seale is unlikely to prove that the pre-indictment delay
caused him any actual prejudice. Even if Seale is able to prove some
modicum of actual prejudice, he must also satisfy the second prong of
Marion, which requires a showing that the prosecution was more than
simply negligent in failing to bring charges in the intervening time
period. 136 As a result, any argument Seale makes with respect to his due
process rights is likely to fail given the steep burden imposed on defendants
in proving a due process violation.
C. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NOT APPLYING THE 1972
AMENDMENT RETROACTIVELY

The final question to consider in analyzing Seale’s conviction and
similar § 1201 prosecutions is whether an application of the 1972
amendment to § 1201 is normatively fair to both the prosecution and the
defendant.
This subpart will begin by discussing the traditional
justifications associated with statute of limitations provisions and the
contemporary changes Congress has made to those traditional notions and
assumptions. This subpart will then address the balance between not
applying the 1972 amendment and the traditional rationales offered in
support of limitations periods. Ultimately, this subpart will conclude from a
normative point of view that the 1972 amendment should not apply
retroactively to § 1201 prosecutions for Civil Rights Era offenses.
1. Traditional Justifications and Contemporary Changes to Statute of
Limitations Periods
The first step in assessing whether Seale’s prosecution is normatively
fair is to briefly recall the generally recited benefits and justifications of a
133

No. 83 Cr. 806–CSH, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17498, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18,
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Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1152–53 (Md. 2001).
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
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well-defined statute of limitations period. 137 The first and perhaps most
obvious justification is that “after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is
sufficient to convict” a defendant. 138 Witnesses’ memories fade and “[f]or
this reason, it will be more difficult . . . to defend . . . against charges
relating to 10-year-old events than 1-week-old events.” 139 A second
identified justification for a statute of limitations period is Congress’s longheld policy favoring repose. 140 The Supreme Court has held that “statutes
of limitation are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.”141 A policy
favoring repose is one that promotes putting an old crime to rest for the
benefit of the accused and for the benefit of society. 142 The accused and the
prosecution can feel a sense of relief knowing that they no longer must be
concerned with an offense committed many years ago. The third traditional
justification for statute of limitations periods asserts that such a period may
encourage “law enforcement officials [to] promptly investigate suspected
criminal activity,” 143 which in effect promotes adjudicatory efficiency
benefiting both the criminal justice system and the accused.144 Finally,
statutes of limitations “provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond
which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair
trial would be prejudiced.” 145 Similar to the third justification, the
predictability justification is often asserted by those in favor of judicial
efficiency. 146 Taken together and bearing in mind the Court’s longstanding
deference to repose, strict and perhaps traditional enforcement of statutory
limitations periods might favor non-prosecution in matters similar to
Seale’s.
Despite what appears to be the criminal justice system’s general policy
towards strictly construing statute of limitations periods, state legislatures
and Congress have been moving to lengthen statute of limitations periods
for many types of criminal offenses. In fact, there have been at least twelve
new exceptions carved out for the federal limitations period in the last
137

See, e.g., Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 115, 129–31 (2008) (identifying the traditional rationales for statute of limitations
periods).
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Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003).
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(1953).
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Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 n.14.
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twenty years. 147 For example, Congress abolished the statute of limitations
for “terrorist offense[s] that ‘resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of,
death or serious bodily injury to another person.’” 148 Likewise, the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s prompted Congress to lengthen the limitations
period from five years to seven years for a “criminal offense of major
procurement fraud committed against the United States.” 149 There have
also been limitations extensions for criminal offenses against children,
trafficking offenses, and certain sexual offenses.150 Finally, and in addition
to the extension of limitations periods for particular types of criminal
activity, Congress has also extended the limitations periods for highly
complex crimes and crimes that may require significant discovery. 151
Given the numerous changes to limitations periods, the traditional
justifications for a statute of limitations are less persuasive. At least one
commentator noted that “Congress had done very little to justify recent
changes to the [limitations] rule[s] in relation to new circumstances or
understandings, and a closer look at the exceptions’ likely effect suggests
that they will undermine the interests and objectives that they have long
been thought to protect.” 152 Thus, erosion of the traditional limitations
periods for certain types of offenses also serves the purpose of eroding the
traditional rationales offered for limitations periods in the first place. Given
these changes, strict construction of a limitations period against Seale and
other similar defendants may no longer be warranted. Given the conflicting
signals pertaining to the justifications given for a statute of limitations
period, it is perhaps best settled by an analysis of the normative
considerations for not applying the 1972 amendment retroactively.
2. Normative Balance Between the 1972 Amendment and the Traditional
Justifications for Statutes of Limitations
Having introduced the justifications and recent legislative history of
limitations periods, it is next important to determine whether those
traditional justifications for a statute of limitations period (notwithstanding
the contemporary changes nullifying many of those justifications) can be
balanced with the norms of fairness and justice. In fact, the first normative
rebuttal to the traditional justification examines the general assumptions
147

Id. at 124.
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about evidence in applying a limitations period in the first place. As was
previously asserted, “evidence is, by its nature, fragile and susceptible to
destruction over time, as memories fade and witnesses die or become
otherwise unavailable,” 153 and there is evidence to suggest that even the
most heinous and thus, most memorable, offenses are subject to the same
deteriorating memories as other offenses.154 It is important to note,
however, that evidence spoliation typically has a disproportionate effect on
the prosecution rather than the defense since the state is charged with
meeting the reasonable doubt standard.155 In fact, “[d]efense lawyers have
often used delay [during the initial proceedings] to their [clients’]
advantage.” 156
In addition to the questionable assumption regarding the evidentiary
burden defendants carry in old prosecutions, there is also a question about
the quality of evidence brought to bear in an old prosecution. As just noted,
prosecutions of old crimes create the potential for failed memories and lost
documents. However, at least one court was satisfied with the ability of
witnesses to recall specific events that occurred forty-one years earlier. 157
Furthermore, a brief psychological analysis of memory suggests that
memories of old crimes can still accurately reproduce details of the offense
in certain circumstances.158
DNA analysis and other scientific advances in the collection of
evidence may also bridge the divide between failed memories and
contemporary prosecutions. Some commentators suggest that “[g]iven
these advances, the need for limitation periods has diminished.” 159 On the
other hand, the imposition of scientific methods such as DNA testing seems
to at least anecdotally create a presumption of guilt against the defendant. 160
While the purported accuracy rates of DNA evidence remain high, it is
worth noting that forensic scientists are also “fallible and sometimes blind
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to their own shortcomings.” 161 While there was no suggestion with respect
to the existence of DNA evidence that linked Seale to the deaths of Moore
and Dee in any Seale opinion, the fact that these scientific methods exist
pokes a hole in the infallibility of the statute of limitations justification
regarding evidence spoliation.
The second normative rebuttal to the traditional justifications examines
the benefits of repose. Repose has long been identified as a justification
based on the theory that “[t]he passage of time may . . . lead to profound
changes in . . . identity.” 162 Additionally, more recent arguments for repose
have focused on society’s interest in forgiving the wrongs of the past. 163
Nevertheless, the latter argument in a case such as Seale’s would create
injustice to the family members of the two murder victims. 164 For example,
anecdotal evidence from victims’ families suggests the existence of a
therapeutic value associated with a conviction.165 More specifically, some
commentators suggest that the victims’ confrontation of the past wrong
“may reasonably achieve the objective of helping the victim understand
where he or she stands in relation to the offense.” 166 It may also “relieve
the victim of feelings of guilt,” and free the victim from continued fear.167
While this normative rebuttal to the traditional justifications is
psychological, there is no reason to dismiss it as unimportant. In fact, many
courts seem to appreciate the value associated with victims’ feelings as they
permit victim impact statements to be read during the sentencing phase of a
trial 168
Finally, the third normative rebuttal to the traditional statute of
limitations justifications examines the existence of often blatant
prosecutorial misconduct in many Civil Rights Era crimes that resulted in
unprosecuted crimes such as those committed by Seale and De La
Beckwith. This prosecutorial misconduct is in complete contrast to the
161
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traditional justification that argues that limitations periods promote prompt
investigations. As was previously noted, the perfunctory investigation of
Seale and Edwards in late 1964 and the speed with which the charges were
dropped suggest that neither man would have ever been convicted in a
1960s courtroom, even with overwhelming evidence proving their guilt. 169
Furthermore, one news account recounting the 1964 dismissal suggested
that Seale and Edwards began spreading rumors that they were mistreated
by the police during and after their arrest.170 The prosecutor acknowledged
that the evidence against Seale and Edwards was strong, but ultimately
dismissed the case since he was sure a grand jury would not bring an
indictment if there was even a slight intimation that the men were beaten by
the police. 171 Applying the 1972 amendment retroactively would therefore
allow for the perverse result of almost condoning the actions of statesponsored racism by local and federal prosecutors, contravening the
investigatory efficiency justification for a limitations period. Therefore, the
final normative rebuttal for not applying the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is
to limit the protections that were given to wrongdoers by a corrupt and
racist criminal justice system.
Ultimately, the normative justifications for refusing to apply the 1972
amendment to § 1201 are strong and include the diminishing presumption
that evidence is easily spoiled, a reluctance to create injustice towards the
victims’ families, and a reluctance to perpetuate the prosecutorial
misconduct of the era. While these justifications certainly apply to § 1201
prosecutions, some commentators advocate an even more sweeping
change. 172 Robinson and Cahill suggest that “statutes of limitation no
longer serve a legitimate purpose, at least for serious offenses, but they
continue to cause failures of justice and should therefore be abolished or
greatly curtailed.” 173 While this last assertion concerning the continued
viability of limitations periods is outside the scope of this Comment, it is at
a minimum suggestive that the traditional justifications for a limitations
period seem to be less relevant for purposes of Civil Rights Era offenses
such as James Ford Seale’s.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ERA PROSECUTIONS
The effects of the Civil Rights Era still reverberate throughout the
South. Those effects include the question of how to proceed and whether to
prosecute heinous, racially motivated crimes that were committed over forty
years ago. In fact, the FBI has identified approximately ninety-five
“unsolved hate crimes from the Civil Rights Era” that are under active
investigation. 174 Furthermore, in 2008, Congress passed and President
Bush signed the “Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act,” 175 which
allocated $135 million to the Department of Justice and the assignment of
permanent Department of Justice personnel to the continuing investigation
of open civil rights crimes committed before 1969. 176 While the amount of
money allocated to solving old crimes is modest, this bill illustrates the
government’s and perhaps the country’s continued desire to prosecute these
crimes. Therefore, determining whether the 1972 amendment to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 should apply retroactively has important ramifications for these
future Civil Rights Era and perhaps even future organized crime
prosecutions.
In assessing whether the 1972 amendment should apply retroactively,
this Comment began by analyzing two tools of statutory interpretation.
Most importantly, the general rule against retroactivity suggests that the
1972 amendment should not apply retroactively to crimes committed prior
to 1972. Moreover, even to the extent that a court would construe a change
to the statute of limitations as procedural, a court could not ignore the
potential injustice created in not prosecuting a crime such as Seale’s.
Additionally, and notwithstanding the unlimited statute of limitations
period, a potential for due process abuse towards the defendant exists.
However, the burden placed on the defendant in proving such a violation
includes both actual prejudice and intent on behalf of the government to
obtain a tactical advantage. Again, to the extent Seale or a similarly
situated defendant could prove actual prejudice, there is little hope in that
defendant proving actual intent on the part of the government to gain a
tactical advantage. Finally, the normative rebuttals to the traditional
justifications for not applying the 1972 amendment retroactively are a
compelling reason to proceed with a prosecution.
Civil Rights Era crimes have the potential to remain a part of the fabric
of this country as long as there are open cases that have gone unprosecuted.
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To the extent that these crimes implicate 18 U.S.C. § 1201, courts have the
tools to confront these crimes head-on. Ultimately, the Department of
Justice should continue prosecuting these crimes in an effort to bring
closure to a sad chapter in this country’s history.

